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Comment

Overview of Bad Faith
Litigation in Missouri
I. INTRODUCTION
Under a standard liability agreement, an insurer owes its insured both a duty
to defend and a duty to indemnify.' When an insurer breaches either duty, the
insured may have a cause of action for bad faith. Bad faith liability derives from
a contract principle, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This
implied covenant exists in insurance policies2 and governs virtually every duty
and obligation the insurer owes to the insured.3 It requires the insurer to act in
good faith when considering settlement offers during its defense of the insured.
4
Bad faith liability is a separate cause of action from failure to defend. If
an insurer is obligated to provide a defense, but fails to do so, the insured has a
cause of action for breach of contract.' Where the insurer has an opportunity to
settle a claim against its insured within the policy limits, but fails to do so, the
insured may have an action for "bad faith" refusal to settle.'
This Comment addresses these situations and details Missouri's approach
to bad faith claims against insurers.

1. Barry W. Lee, Section VII 'BadFaithLiability',296 PLI/Lit 713, 718 (1985).

2. Id ("The creation of an implied-in-law duty to deal fairly and in good faith has
been justified on the grounds that (a) insurance policies are personal and are designed to
protect individuals from the risks of accidental losses rather than to obtain commercial
advantages, (b) there is a fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured, and
(c) the uneven bargaining strength between the insured and insurer, together with the
alleged 'adhesive' nature of insurance contracts requires that the insurer be held
accountable for unreasonable practices." (citations omitted)).
3. John H. Mathias, Jr., et al.,
Emerging Issues in Bad Faith Litigation,516 PLI/Lit

97, 103 (1994).
4. Ganaway v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
5. Butters v. City of Independence, 513 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. 1974); Bonner v.
Automobile Club Inter-Ins. Exch., 899 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Landie v.
Century Indem. Co., 390 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
6. Ganaway, 795 S.W.2d at 556.
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II. LEGAL HISTORY OF THE INSURANCE
BAD FAITH CLAIM
Over the past thirty years, "[w]hat was once an area of law which was fairly
tidy and predictable [has become] the most dynamic and fluid area of American
law."' This change can most likely be attributed to the birth and evolution of bad
faith litigation. Previously, insurance litigation issues focused on coverage
interpretations and technical policy defenses.8 Although the courts treated
insurance policies as contracts of adhesion and construed ambiguities against the
drafters, damages awarded against insurers were confined to those available
under the more limited rules governing contract breaches (i.e., breach of the
insurance policy).' However, with the recent evolution of bad faith claims,
insurers now are faced with the possibility of damage awards far exceeding the
policy limits. With the recovery caps removed, lawyers of the insured have been
quick to capitalize on this burgeoning area of law.'0
The Missouri Supreme Court first addressed the issue of bad faith failure
to settle in Zwnwalt v. UtilitiesInsuranceCo." In Zumwalt, the plaintiff sought
to recover for an insurance company's bad faith and negligence in failing to settle
a suit against the plaintiff within the limits of a liability policy. 2 Although this
was a case of first impression for the Missouri Supreme Court, the Eastern
District Court of Appeals had previously decided this issue in McCombs v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co.'3 In McCombs,14 the court conducted an extensive
review of the cases from other states and from the federal courts,' and found that
"[tlhe courts are not in agreement in holding the insurer liable for negligence in
refusing to settle, but there is no disagreement with respect to the insurer's
6
liability where bad faith appears."'1
Following this logic, the supreme court, in Zumwalt, held that unless the
insurer was guilty of fraud or bad faith in refusing to settle a claim within the

7. Guy 0. Kornblum, The Current State of Bad Faith and Punitive Damage
Litigationin the U.S., 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 812, 813 (1988).

8. id.
9. id.
10. Id.
11. 228 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Mo. 1950).

12. Id. at 751.
13. Id. at 753.
14. 89 S.W.2d 114, 118 (Mo. Ct. App. 1936).

15. Id. at 121.
16. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/3
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policy limits, the insurer would not be held liable for ajudgment in excess of the
policy limits. 7 In rejecting the negligence standard, the court stated:
We have reviewed many authorities on the question and think the weight of
authority is that where the insurer in a liability policy reserves the exclusive

right to contest or settle any claim brought against the insured, and prohibits
him from voluntarily assuming any liability or settling any claims without the
insurer's consent, except at his own costs, and the provisions of the policy
provide that the insurer may compromise or settle such a claim within the
policy limits, no action will lie against the insurer for the amount of the
judgment recovered against the insured in excess of the policy limits, unless
the insuredis guilty offraud or badfaith in refusingto settle a claim within

the limits of the policy. There are cases that hold that the insured is entitled
to recover upon proof that the insurer in refusing to settle a claim for damages
was guilty of negligence. But this test is rejected in the better reason[ed]
cases and we think rightly so. 8

III. FIRST-PARTY ACTIONS-STATUTORY
VEXATIOUS REFUSAL TO PAY
Like types of insurance, bad faith liability claims fall into two general
categories-first-party claims and third-party claims. First-party insurance
reimburses the insured for losses covered by the insurance policy. These losses
can be incurred by either injury to the insured or damage to the insured's
property. Many states allow the insured to bring an actionable tort against his
insurer for failing to reimburse the insured on a claim covered by the policy. 9
In this scenario, the insured and injured party are the same person. This is
defined as a first-party cause of action. A third-party cause of action, on the
other hand, is one in which the insured or the insured's assignee brings a cause
of action against his insurer for a bad faith refusal to settle or defend his claim
with the injured or aggrieved party.
A. Statutory Preemption
Since it is preempted by statute, the tort of bad faith does not exist in
Missouri with respect to first-party claims by an insured against an insurance
company. 0 Nevertheless, an insured can bring a cause of action for vexatious

17. Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 228 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Mo. 1950).
18. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
19. Barry R. Ostrager & Thomas R. Newman, BadFaith and Wrongful Refusal to
Settle: Liability in Excess ofPolicy Limits, 518 PLI/Lit 233, 284 (1995).

20. Koehrer v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 931 S.W.2d 898, 898 (Mo. Ct. App.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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refusal to pay under Missouri Revised Statutes Sections 375.296 and 375.420.
These statutes provide the insured a right to assert a cause of action for damages,
in addition to breach of contract damages, when the insurer has not complied
with the terms of the applicable statute. The two statutes authorize damages for
vexatious delay and provide that the court or jury may award vexatious damages
and attorney's fees "in addition" to the amount due under the contract (Section
375.296) or the loss (Section 375.420).21 These two statutes differ in that
Section 375.296 applies only to insurance companies not authorized to do
business in Missouri.'
Section 375.296, AdditionalDamagesfor Vexatious Refusal to Pay, states:
In any action, suit or other proceeding instituted against any insurance
company, association or other insurer upon any contract of insurance issued
or delivered in this state to a resident of this state, or to a corporation
incorporated in or authorized to do business in this state, if the insurer has
failed or refused for a period ofthirty days after due demand therefor prior to
the institution of the action, suit or proceeding, to make payment under and
in accordance with the terms and provisions of the contract of insurance, and
it shall appear from the evidence that the refusal was vexatious and without
reasonable cause, the court or jury may, in addition to the amount due under
the provisions of the contract of insurance and interest thereon, allow the
plaintiff damages for vexatious refusal to pay and attorney's fees as provided
in Section 375.420. Failure of an insurer to appear and defend any action, suit
or other proceeding shall be deemed prima facie evidence that its failure to
make payment was vexatious without reasonable cause.
Section 375.420, Vexatious Refusal to Pay Claim, Damagesfor, Exception,
states:
In any action against any insurance company to recover the amount of any
loss under a policy of automobile, fire, cyclone, lightning, life, health,
accident, employers' liability, burglary, theft, embezzlement, fidelity,
indemnity, marine, or other insurance except automobile liability insurance,
if it appears from the evidence that such company has refused to pay such loss
without reasonable cause or excuse, the court or jury may, in addition to the
amount thereof and interest, allow the plaintiff damages not to exceed twenty
percent of the first fifteen hundred dollars of the loss, and ten percent of the
amount of the loss in excess of fifteen hundred dollars and a reasonable
attorney's fee; and the court shall enter judgment for the aggregate sum found
in the verdict.

1996).
21. Calvert v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 660 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
22. Rife v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 833 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992); Willis v American Natl Life Ins. Co., 287 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/3
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B. Application of the Cause ofAction
In order to sustain an award under these statutes, "[the] plaintiff must show
that the insurer's refusal to pay the loss was willful and without reasonable cause,
as the facts would appear to a reasonable and prudent person before trial."'
Furthermore, a plaintiffs verdict for the policy proceeds is not sufficient
evidence in and of itself to warrant vexatious refusal penalties. "Vexatious
refusal to pay is not to be deduced from the mere fact that upon trial the verdict
is adverse to defendant. The word 'vexatiously', as used in the statute, Section
375.420 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., means without reasonable or probable cause or
24
excuse."
The "before trial" phrase in the above quotation "is significant because the
fact that the trial judgment is adverse to the insurer's contention is not sufficient
reason to impose the statutory penalty."' Whether a refusal was vexatious must
be determined by the facts as they reasonably appeared at the time the insurer
refused to pay. 26 "An insurance company's right to resist payment upon one of

its policies cannot be determined by the facts as found by the jury, but must be
determined by the facts as they reasonably appeared to it before the trial."27
The Missouri Supreme Court has provided guidance in determining whether
evidence supports an award for vexatious refusal:
The existence of a litigable issue, either factual or legal, does not preclude a
vexatious penalty where there is evidence the insurer's attitude was vexatious
and recalcitrant. Direct and specific evidence to show vexatious refusal is not
required[;] the jury may find vexatious [delay] upon a general survey and a
consideration of the whole testimony and all the facts and circumstances in
28
connection with the case.

23. Dewitt v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 667 S.W.2d 700, 710 (Mo. 1984)
(emphasis added).
24. Pfingsten v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 330 S.W.2d 806, 817 (Mo. 1959).
25. Russell v. Farmers & Merchants Ins. Co., 834 S.W.2d 209, 221 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992) (citing Groves v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 540 S.W.2d 39, 42 (Mo. 1976);
Katz Drug Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 647 S.W.2d 831, 839 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983)).
26. Id.; Katz 647 S.W.2d at 839.
27. State ex rel. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 152 S.W.2d 132, 134
(Mo. 1941).
28. Dewitt v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 667 S.W.2d 700, 710 (Mo. 1984).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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The burden of proof is on the insured,29 and the vexatious refusal statutes,
being penal in nature, must be strictly construed. 0 "This strict construction
requires that an award [under these statutes] be considered discretionary with the
trial court."'" The court first decides whether there is sufficient evidence to
support such a claim. If so, the court then addresses the issues of whether any
penalty should be awarded by the court or jury, and if so, how much.12 These
issues are purely discretionary matters for the judge.3
C. Examples of Vexatious Refusals
The following are just a few of the many situations in which vexatious
refusal penalties have been awarded:
1. Refusal to pay based on a suspicion that is unsupported by substantial
facts;

34

2. Persistence in refusal to pay after insurer becomes aware that it has no
35
meritorious defense;
3. Refusal to pay based on an inadequate investigation and a denial of
liability without stating a ground for denial;36
4. Refusal to pay founded not on what appeared to be the facts, but on a
possibility that later investigation would develop facts justifying a refusal
to pay, even if such investigation did develop such facts. 7
D. PossibleDefenses
Missouri Revised Statutes Section 375.296 requires a showing that the
insurance company's "refusal [to pay] was vexatious without reasonable cause."
Likewise, Missouri Revised Statutes Section 375.420 requires a showing that the
insurance company "has refused to pay such loss without reasonable cause or
29. Parker v. National Found. Life Ins. Co., 805 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Mo. Ct. App.
1991).
30. Id.; Katz, 647 S.W.2d at 840.
31. Katz, 647 S.W.2d at 840.
32. Dewitt, 667 S.W.2d at 711 (citing Morris v. Reed, 510 S.W.2d 234, 242 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1974)).

33. Id.
34. Allen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 753 S.W.2d 616, 620 (Mo. Ct. App.
1988).
35. Ireland v. Manufacturers & Merchants Indem. Co., 298 S.W.2d 529, 534 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1957).

36. Allen, 753 S.W.2d at 620.
37. Buffalo Ins. Co. v. Bommarito, 42 F.2d 53, 57 (8th Cir. 1930) (cited as
authority in Still v. Travelers Indem. Co., 374 S.W.2d 95 (Mo. 1963)).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/3
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excuse." Discussed below are defenses that courts have recognized and made
available to insurance companies in vexatious refusal to pay cases.
1. Reasonable Cause or Excuse
As this is an element of the plaintiffs cause of action, it is technically not
a defense." Nevertheless, an insurer can escape liability by showing that it had
either a reasonable cause or excuse for its refusal to pay. The following
examples are illustrative of this concept.
First, an insurer has the right to refuse payment and defend a suit so long
as it has reasonable grounds to believe its defense is meritorious.39 However, if
the insurer is aware that no such grounds exist and persists in its refusal to pay
the policy, then it becomes subject to penalties for vexatious delay.40
Also, an insurer may ask for ajudicial determination of its liability without
becoming subject to a vexatious delay penalty for good faith contest of the
claim.4 An honest difference of opinion as to the extent of liability is allowed.42
An insurer will not be penalized for insisting, in good faith, on a judicial
determination of open questions of fact or law determinative of the issue of
liability.43 Disputes over the proximate cause of an insured's death" and the
appropriate statute of limitations to apply 45 represent two such questions.
Finally, in some situations, the law is unsettled, and, thus, the insurer has
no way of ascertaining the extent of liability. For example, in Hopkins v.

38. Mo. REv. STAT. § 375.296 (1994); Mo. REV. STAT. § 375.420 (1994).
39. State ex rel John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 152 S.W.2d 132, 134
(Mo. 1941) (quoting State ex rel. Confidential Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 262 S.W.2d 43, 45
(Mo. 1924)).

40. Id; See also Morris v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., 895 S.W.2d 73, 78 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995).

41. Howard v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 164 S.W.2d 360, 366 (Mo. 1942).
42. Id.
43. Cohen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 444 S.W.2d 498, 506 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969)
(citing Rohlfing v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 349 S.W.2d 472 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961)).
44. Young v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. 1950) (holding

defendant's refusal to pay not vexatious when the plaintiff claimed life insurance benefits
under a double indemnity clause for accidental death, and the issue of whether the

proximate cause of death was disease or accident presented a question of fact upon which
there could be an honest difference of opinion).
45. Crenshaw v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 482 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that

under Missouri law, statute of limitations issue raisedby defendant insurer was an open
question of law such that refusal to pay could not, to a legal certainty, be considered
vexatious).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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American Economy Insurance Co.,' an insurance company refused to allow an
insured to stack underinsured motorist coverage. 47 The insured brought an action
for vexatious refusal to pay.4 However, because the law was unclear on whether
an insured could stack underinsured coverage, the court did not impose a penalty
on the insurance company.49
2. Contract Defenses
An insured's claim for vexatious refusal to pay is dependent upon what is
contained in the insurance policy. Before any vexatious refusal claim can
succeed, coverage must first be found to exist under the policy. Since the
insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and the insured, an insurer may
be able to escape liability for its refusal to pay based on defenses applicable to
general contract law.
When.the language in the policy is ambiguous, courts may resort to wellestablished contract principles to ascertain its meaning."0 The insurance
company may be able to convince the court of a favorable construction by
evidence of the parties' acts, conduct, or declarations indicating a certain
understanding:5'
It is a well-established rule of law that the construction placed upon a contract
by the parties as evidenced by acts, conduct, or declarations indicating a
mutual intent and understanding will be adopted by the courts where the
language of the contract is ambiguous, or there is reasonable doubt as to its
meaning, but not where it is plain and unambiguous. 2

However, where this evidence is lacking, the court may treat the insurance policy
as a contract of adhesion and construe any ambiguities against the drafters.
Also, misrepresentations by an insured may be an effective way for the
insurer to avoid the policy. Without a valid policy, the insured has no basis for
a vexatious refusal to pay claim:
The rule in this state, as we understand it, is that where material
representations made in an application for a policy of life insurance are

46. 896 S.W.2d 933 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
47. Id.

48. Id.
49. Id. at 945.
50. Howard v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 164 S.W.2d 360, 366 (Mo. 1942).
51. Id.
52. Id. (citing Scotten v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 81 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Mo.

1935)).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/3
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warranted to be true, or the policy is conditioned upon the truth of the
representations, or provides that the falsity of the representations shall avoid
the policy, then the representations, if in fact untrue, will avoid the policy,
though the representations were innocently made. This is so because such is
the contract. The insurer is entitled to stand on the contract as written, and the
innocence of the insured in making the representations is a matter of no
concern. But where there is no such warranty or provision in the policy, a
misrepresentation, in order to avoid the policy must have been fraudulently
made. This isthe rule applicable to contracts generally, and we see no reason
why an exception should be made with respect to insurance contracts. 3
An insurance company will be bound by its soliciting agent's knowledge of
false or incorrect statements made in an insurance application.54 An exception
to this rule exists when the agent and the applicant act in fraudulent collusion in
connection with the application." However, this rule of constructive knowledge
should not be applied in connection with inflicting penalties for vexatious
delay. 6
In addition to the contract and misrepresentation defenses, a statute of
limitations defense may be available to the insurer.5 7
3. Federal Preemption
If an insurance plan satisfies the statutory requirements, a claim against the
insurance company under the Missouri vexatious refusal to pay statute is
preempted by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)." To
be governed by ERISA, the insurance plan must be: (1) a plan, fund or program;
53. Dixon v. Business Men's Ins. Co. of Am., 285 S.W.2d 619, 625 (Mo. 1955)
(quoting Houston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 97 S.W.2d 856, 860 (M\o. Ct. App.
1936)).
54. State ex rel.John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 152 S.W.2d 132, 134
(Mo. 1941).
55. Id.

56. Id. The supreme court, recognizing that it was matter of common routine in
the insurance business, took judicial notice that the duty of the soliciting agent was to
secure applications and not be involved with the payment or refusal of claims. Therefore,
it might be possible to impute this constructive knowledge to the company where the
agent is involved somehow with the payment or refusal of claims. Id.
57. See Lamb v. Amalgamated Labor Life Ins. Co., 602 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1979);
Crenshaw v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 482 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1965); Lumbermen's Mut. Cas.
Co. v. Norris Grain Co., 343 F.2d 670 (8th Cir. 1965); Nelson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 359
F. Supp. 271 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Taylor v. Farmers Ins. Co., 906 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995).
58. Kelly v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 765 F. Supp. 1406, 1408 (W.D. Mo.
1991).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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(2) established or maintained; (3) by an employer or by an employee
organization, or both; (4) for the purpose of providing medical, surgical, or
hospital care, sickness, accident, disability, death, unemployment or vacation
benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, day care centers, scholarship
funds, prepaid legal services or severance benefits; (5) to the participants or their
beneficiaries. 9
E. Assignment
The general rule is that "an assignment made by the insured after the event
has occurred on which liability under an insurance policy is predicated does not
violate a policy provision prohibiting assignment of the policy or its benefits."I
This principal has been extended to include the awards deriving from a vexatious
refusal to pay claim."
Although decided under an older and slightly different statutory version,
several Missouri cases held that penalties and attorney's fees awarded pursuant
to the vexatious refusal to pay statute were assignable.62 Even though the
statutory language has changed slightly, these cases retain their precedential
value. "During the course of revisions, however, the principal language of the
statute has remained the same, and the particular phraseology which formed the
basis for the court's ruling in Lehman [v. HarfordFire Insurance Co.63] still
remains intact in the current statute. "I Relying on this, a federal district court,
interpreting Missouri law, held that the attorney's fees and penalty awarded
under the statute requiring insurer to pay for unwarranted and vexatious delays
were assignable.6"

59. Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 859 F.2d 96, 98-99 (9th Cir. 1988).
60. Magers v. National Life &Accident Ins. Co., 329 S.W.2d 752,756 (Mo. 1959)
(suggesting that there may be situations wherein the right of the beneficiary to assign the
proceeds of a life policy may be properly limited or prohibited altogether).
61. Citicorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 672 F. Supp. 1105 (N.D. Il1.
1987) (interpreting Missouri law).
62. Id. at 1108 (citing Still v. Travelers Indem. Co., 374 S.W.2d 95 (Mo. 1963)
(holding that an assignment of claims under fire policies could include a claim for
penalties for vexatious delay in payments due under the policy); Bergeson v. General Ins.
Co. of Am., 148 S.W.2d 812, 820 (Mo. Ct. App. 1941) (holding that claims for attorney's
fees and the statutory penalty requiring in~ure[r] to pay for unwarranted and vexatious
delays were assignable)).
63. 167 S.W.2d at 1047, 1050 (Mo. Ct. App 1914).
64. Citicorp,672 F. Supp. at 1108.

65. Id at 1109 ("[U]nder Missouri law, a statutory claim for punitive damages and
attorney's fees is clearly assignable.").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/3
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F. Damages
Both vexatious delay statutes permit the court or jury to award damages
and/or attorney's fees in addition to any amount due under the contract (Section
375.296) or the loss (Section 375.420).66 However, only Section 375.420
dictates how the vexatious delay damages are to be calculated.'
1. Statutorily Calculated Damages
A cause of action based on the allegation that an insurance company
negligently denied payment to an insured following the filing of a proof of loss
is preempted by Section 375.420, the vexatious refusal to pay statute. 8 The
vexatious refusal to pay statute provides in pertinent part:
[T]he court orjury may, in addition to the amount thereof and interest, allow
the plaintiff damages not to exceed twenty percent of the first fifteen hundred
dollars of the loss, and ten percent of the amount of the loss in excess of
fifteen hundred dollars and a reasonable attorney's fee; and the court shall
enter judgment for the aggregate sum found in the verdict.69
2. Attorney's Fees
Section 375.420 allows a plaintiff to recover the value of any attorney's fees
provided the fees are reasonable. This award is allowable despite the denial of
vexatious damages. "To recover attorney fees authorized by 375.296 and
375.420, the claim must be supported by appropriate pleadings, and the
allegations must be sustained by proof."70 Without evidence in the record
showing the reasonable value of the attorney's services, the issue of attorney's
fees under the statute should not be submitted.!

66. Calvert v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 660 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
67. Mo. REV. STAT. § 375.296 (1994) provides: "I]he court orjury may ... allow
the plaintiff damages for vexatious refusal to pay and attorney's fees as provided in
section 375.420."
68. Meeker v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 766 S.W.2d 733, 742 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
69. Mo. REv. STAT. § 375.420 (1994).
70. Russell v. Farmers & Merchants Ins. Co., 834 S.W.2d 209,224 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992) (citing Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 277 F.2d 765, 771 (8th Cir. 1960); Fay v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 187 S.W. 861, 865 (Mo. 1916)).
71. Id.
(citing Fay, 187 S.W. at 865; Williams v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 618
S.W.2d 229, 233 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); City of Aururo v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 165
S.W. 357, 362 (Mo. Ct. App. 1914) (the statute requires that the fee be reasonable)).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997

11

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 3

MISSOURI LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 62

In Dewitt v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.,72 the Missouri

Supreme Court held that an award of attorney's fees without an award of
vexatious damages is not improper:
Numerous cases have allowed the imposition of attorney fees without an
additional award of damages!3 We note that "[t]his statute on its face is
permissive not mandatory. The question of whether any penalty will be
awarded, and if so, how much, is a matter of pure discretion."'74 We conclude
that the award of attorneys fees alone is not improper."

3. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages, which cannot constitute an independent cause of action,76
must be incident to another cause of action." Punitive damages are within the
discretion of the jury when the necessary elements such as malice and fraud are
present.78 They cannot be awarded unless there is a cause of action for
compensatory damages79 and the party bringing such an action actually recovers
at least nominal compensatory damages. 0 An award of actual damages is a
prerequisite to the recovery of punitive damages.8 However, when a case is
independent of punitive damages, but nevertheless provides sufficient evidence
of circumstances justifying punitive damages, the plaintiff has a right to, and the
court is required to, submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury.82
With these general rules, one would think that punitive damages would be
recoverable in a vexatious refusal claim. In a literal sense they are, because the
courts treat the statutory damages for vexatious refusal to pay not as penalties but
as punitive damages.8 3 "The Supreme Court of Missouri has declared that such
72. 667 S.W.2d 700, 711 (Mo. 1984).
73. Id.(citing Duckworth v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 452 S.W.2d 280,
287 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970) (award reversed on appeal because of a finding of no vexatious
refusal); Willis v. American Nal Life Ins. Co., 287 S.W.2d 98, 100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956);
Evans v. Great Northern Life Ins. Co., 167 S.W.2d 118, 125 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942)).
74. Id.(quoting Morris v. Reed, 510 S.W.2d 234,242 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974)).
75. Dewitt, 667 S.W.2d at 711.
76. Landum v. Livingston, 394 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.at 579.
80. Id.(citing Hoagland v. Forest Park Highlands Amusement Co., 70 S.W. 878
(Mo. 1902)).
81. Smith v. Piper, 423 S.W.2d 22, 27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
82. Landum v. Livingston, 394 S.W.2d 573, 579 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) (citing
Spitzengel v. Greenlease Motor Car Co., 136 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940)).
83. State ex reL United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Walsh, 540 S.W.2d 137, 141
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[vexatious] damages and attorney fees are... punitive in character."' However,
the measure of damages recoverable in vexatious refusal to pay actions is limited
to the amount of loss, interest, statutory penalty of specified percentage of loss,
and reasonable attorney's fees.85 Therefore, plaintiffs punitive damage award or
statutory penalty is limited to the amount allowed by the vexatious refusal to pay
statute.86
4. Interest
Section 375.420 states in pertinent part: "[T]he court or jury may, in
addition to the amount thereof and interest, allow the plaintiff damages .... "
Thus, in a claim for vexatious refusal, an insured may collect interest on the
amount withheld. This interest is not conditioned on a finding of vexatiousness.
In Catron v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co.,87 the Missouri Supreme
Court held that the insureds were entitled to prejudgment interest, even though
the damages awarded were less than those sought. In reaching its holding, the
court relied on "[t]he often stated general rule... that interest is not recoverable
on an unliquidated demand,"88 and the various interpretations and exceptions to
this general rule.8 9 Vexatious refusal claims constitute one such instance.
"Missouri courts have allowed prejudgment interest for insurance claims where
the parties did not agree to the amount due under the policy."' By allowing
interest, courts rely on the traditional purpose interest serves of compensating for
(Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (noting Jones v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 155 S.W. 1106, 1110
(Mo. Ct. App. 1913)).
84. American Sur. Co. v. Franciscus, 127 F.2D 810, 817 (8th Cir. 1942) (citing
Jones, 155 S.W. at 1110).
85. Baker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 495, 497 (8th Cir. 1988)
(citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 375.420 (1986)).
86. Id.
87. 723 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. 1987).
88. Id at 6 (citing Fohn v. Title Ins. Corp., 529 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Mo. 1975); Laughlin
v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 189 S.W.2d 974, 979 (Mo. 1945)).
89. Id. (citing Burger v. Wood, 446 S.W.2d 436, 443-44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969)).
90. Id at 7 (citing Hawkinson Tread Tire Serv. Co. v. Indiana Lumbermen's Mut.
Ins. Co., 245 S.W.2d 24 (Mo. 1951) (the court characterized the parties' differing

estimates of loss as a disagreement regarding the extent of the insurer's liability and
allowed an award for prejudgment interest); DeLisle v. Cape Mut. Ins. Co., 675 S.W.2d
97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (the court awarded prejudgment interest on a disputed insurance
claim where the dispute was created by the conflicting damage estimates provided by th
parties' experts); Boenzle v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 258 S.W.2d 938 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1953) (the court awarded prejudgment interest, although the insured had

demanded a much greater sum than was actually owed him, finding that the amount had
become due and payable thirty days after the insured filed the proof of loss)).
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the use, or the loss of use, of money to which a person is entitled.9' Further, the
Catron court may have considered equitable principles of fairness and justice
when awarding prejudgment interest. 92
Another court reached the same result by concluding that an amount due
does not become unliquidated because the defendant contests its liability under
the policy.93 "A liquidated claim is one that is readily ascertainable by reference
to recognized standards. The fact that defendant contests its liability under the
policy does not make the amount due unliquidated."I Therefore, the general
rule is applicable to the liquidated claim, and, in this case, pre-judgment interest
was properly assessed.
Furthermore, interest can be awarded to a party regardless of whether
vexatious damages or attorney's fees are awarded. "Section 375.420 RSMo 1986
authorizes damages and reasonable attorney's fees for vexatious refusal to pay.
Those awards are in addition to the amount of the loss and interest. The interest
award therefore is not conditioned upon vexatious refusal to pay."9
5. When Insured Seeks More Than the
Vexatious Refusal Statute Allows
In general, there can be no vexatious refusal when a plaintiff seeks a
recovery for more than he is entitled,9 6 "at least when the admitted portion is
insignificant in comparison with the total amount which is wrongfully
claimed."' However, an exception exists when there is a dispute over both the
amount due and the liability under the policy and the plaintiff recovers less than

91. Id.
(citing Laughlin v. Nat'l Bank, 189 S.W.2d 974, 979 (Mo. 1945)).
92. Id.
(citing St. Louis Housing Auth. v. Magafas, 324 S.W.2d 697, 700 (Mo.
1959); General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hercules Constr. Co., 385 F.2d 13, 25 (8th Cir. 1967)).
93. Glover v. Missouri Property Ins. Placement Facility, 676 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1984).
94. Id (citing Schmidt v. Morival Farms, 240 S.W.2d 952, 961 (Mo. 1951); Twin
River Constr. Co. v. Public Water Dist., 653 S.W.2d 682, 695 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)).
95. Hester v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 733 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987).
96. Berry v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 621 S.W.2d 948, 953 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)
(citing Irelan v. Standard Mut. Ass'n, 379 S.W.2d 815, 821 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964)).
97. Irelan, 379 S.W.2d at 821 (citing Boenzle v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 258 S.W.2d 938 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953); Brown v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 140 S.W.2d
91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940)).
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the amount for which he sued."
precluded.99

In this situation, a vexatious recovery is not

G. HearsayEvidence Issues
A plaintiff is not required to present direct and specific evidence in proving
his vexatious refusal claim. "Direct and specific evidence to show vexatious
refusal is not required, the jury may find vexatious delay upon a general survey
and a consideration of the whole testimony and all the facts and circumstances
in connection with the case."'"0 Given the nature of this first-party cause of
action, hearsay evidence is often admissible and necessary for the plaintiff to
prove his case.'
In Goodman v. State Farm Insurance Co., the court admitted hearsay
evidence involving the testimony of an insurance company's investigator
concerning statements made to him by insured's neighbors which linked the
insured to the fire in question."° This testimony was properly admitted because
it was not offered for its truth, but was offered to establish the information in the
possession of the defendant when it denied plaintiffs' claim. 3 Thus, it was
relevant to the plaintiffs' allegations of vexatious refusal to pay injected into the
lawsuit by plaintiffs' petition."° But if the plaintiffs so requested, they were
entitled to an instruction limiting the extent to which, and the purpose for which,
the jury could consider this evidence. 5
In Scott v. MissouriInsuranceCo., 6 the court admitted hearsay evidence
involving a report prepared for an insurance company during an investigation
concerning death benefits. 7 The issue before the jury was "whether the facts
and evidence in defendant's possession would have caused a reasonable person
in good faith to believe that there was no liability to plaintiff on the [insurance]

98. Berry, 621 S.W.2d at 953 (citing Wood v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 77 S.W.2d
167, 169 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934); Glover v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 186
S.W. 583, 584 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916)).
99. Id.
100. DeWitt v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 667 S.W.2d 700,710 (Mo.1984)
(citing Evans v. Great Northern Life Ins. Co., 167 S.W.2d 118, 125 (1942)).
101. Id.
102. 710 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
103. Id. at 424 (citing Scott v. Missouri Ins. Co., 233 S.W.2d 660 (Mo. 1950);
Toler v. Atlanta Life Ins. Co., 248 S.W.2d 53 (Mo.Ct. App. 1952)).
104. Goodman, 710 S.W.2d at 423.
105. Id.
106. 233 S.W.2d 660, 664 (Mo. 1950).
107. Id.
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policy."'0 8 The court, pointing out that many hearsay exceptions exist,
determined that a report, prepared for the insurance company and relied upon in
reaching its conclusion that it was not liable, was admissible for the limited
purpose of showing the defendant insurance company acted reasonably in
denying plaintiffs claim. 0 9
The report, though hearsay, was relevant and admissible on the issue of
whether there was consideration for the release, that is, whether or not there
was a genuine good faith dispute as to liability and whether the facts and
evidence in defendant's possession would have caused a reasonable person in
good faith to believe that there was no liability to plaintiff on the policy.,
While the report was not competent for the purpose of proving the truth
of the statements set out therein, the report itself and defendant's knowledge
of its content formed a necessary link in a chain of circumstantial evidence
tending to show that defendant had made a reasonable investigation and had
ascertained facts which would cause a reasonable person in good faith to
believe that the insured had heart trouble when the policy was issued; that
such heart trouble caused or contributed to her death; and that defendant was
not liable to plaintiff.'
Thus, the report should have been admitted with a proper limiting instruction.
The court stated:
[W]here evidence is admissible for one purpose or one issue but would be
improper for other purposes and upon other issues in the case, it should be
received. The opponent then has a right to an instruction if he should request
it limiting the extent to which and the purpose for which the jury may
consider such evidence." 2

IV. THIRD-PARTY ACTIONS
In a third-party action, the insured or the insured's assignee asserts a cause
of action against his insurer for damages resulting from the insurer's improper
handling of a third party's claim against the insured. In the first-party action, on

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 665 (citing Foster v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 176 S.W.2d 482, 485 (Mo.
1943); O'Leary v. Scullin Steel Co., 260 S.W. 55, 61 (Mo. 1924); Looffv. Kansas City
Rys. Co., 246 S.W. 578, 580 (Mo. 1922); Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 115 S.W.2d 121,
133 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938)).
111. Id.
112. Scott v. Missouri Ins. Co., 233 S.W.2d 660, 665 (Mo. 1950) (citing State ex
rel. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Shain, 134 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Mo. 1939)).
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the other hand, the insured asserts a claim against his insurer for not reimbursing
him on a' claim covered by the policy. Third-party actions arise in the context
of liability insurance. Only liability insurance is truly third-party insurance
those of strangers to
because the interests protected by the policy are ultimately
13
the contract who are injured by the insured's conduct.
Insurance policies normally contain provisions obligating the insurer to
defend and indemnify claims against the insured. The insurer breaches the
contract if it fails to fulfill these obligations. For example, where an insurer who
is obligated to provide a defense fails to do so, the insured has a cause of action
for breach of contract."'
Additionally, most courts, including those of Missouri, recognize and
impose upon the insurer the duty of acting in "good faith" when handling claims
against the insured." 5 This duty derives from a contract principle, the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This implied covenant exists in
insurance policies" 6 and govems virtually every duty and obligation the insurer
owes to the insured."' It requires the insurer to act in good faith when
considering settlement offers during its defense of the insured." 8 Where the
insurer has an opportunity to settle a claim against its insured within the policy
limits and fails to do so, the insured may have an action for bad faith refusal to
settle." 9

This Comment will address three situations in which a third-party action
may arise. The first situation transpires when an insurer acts in bad faith in
failing to settle a claim against its insured within the policy limits. The second
situation occurs when an insurer, in bad faith, fails to defend a claim against its
insured. The third situation is a combination of the two previous situations. It
occurs when an insurer acts in bad faith in failing to settle and failing to defend
for bad faith refusal to
a claim against the insured. These third-party actions
20
settle and/or defend are actions in tort, not contract.

113.

ROBERT

H. JERRY, II,

UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW

43 (1987).

114. Bonner v. Automobile Club Inter-Ins. Exch., 899 S.W.2d 925,929 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995).
115. Id. at 927.
116. Lee, supranote 2, at 717-18.
117. John H. Mathias, Jr., et al., Emerging Issues in Bad Faith Litigation. 516

PLI/Lit 97 (1994).
118. Ganaway v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
119. Id. at 556.
120. Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 228 S.W.2d 750, 753-54 (Mo. 1950).
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V. BAD FAITH FAILURE TO SETTLE
FOR INSURED-TORTFEASOR

A. Elements
Most bad faith claims arise within the context of a third-party tort claim
against the insured. Typically the claim arises because the insurance company
did not settle a claim when it had an opportunity and demand to do so. This
failure is often the consequence of the conflict of interest between the insurer and
its insured.
For example, suppose P and D are involved in an auto accident in which D
is at fault. If D is insured for $50,000 and P offers to settle for $50,000, D's
insurer likely will not settle. The insurer will litigate since it stands to lose no
more by a verdict in excess of $50,000. However, since D will be personally
liable for this excess, D desires to settle. To provide insureds such as D
protection from this conflict of insurers' interests, the courts have recognized the
bad faith refusal to settle cause of action.
In Dyer v. GeneralAmerican Life InsuranceCo.,' 2 1 the court set forth the
elements of this cause of action as follows:
1. The liability insurer has assumed control over negotiations, settlement,
and legal proceedings brought against the insured;
2. The insured has demanded that the insurer settle the claim brought
against the insured;
3. The insurer refuses to settle the claim within the liability limits of the
policy; and
4. In so refusing, the insurer acts in bad faith, rather than negligently.
B. Factorsto Consider
Determining whether bad faith exists is a question for the trier of fact that
must be decided with reference to the totality of the circumstances. 2 2 In order
to recover, there must be a showing of bad faith, not just negligence." Facts
that may indicate bad faith by the insurer include:
1. Attempts to escape obligations under the policy by an intentional
disregard of the financial interests of the insured;
2. Attempts to force the insured to contribute money to a settlement
within the limits of the policy;

121. 541 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
122. Ganaway,795 S.W.2d at 562.
123. Zumwalt, 228 S.W.2d at 753.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/3

18

Fussner: Fussner: Overview of Bad Faith Litigation in Missouri
1997]

BAD FAITHLITIGATION

3. A preference to gamble on escaping all liability by a favorable verdict
rather than accepting a reasonable settlement;
4. Failing to foresee a probable excess verdict;
5. Following advice not to settle or ignoring settlement advice;
6. Failing to advise the insured about the extent of policy coverage;
7. Failing to disclose policy limits to the claimant;
8. Improperly investigating or evaluating a claim;
9. Failing to advise the insured about the potential for an excess
judgment;
10. Failing to advise the insured about the existence of settlement offers;
11. Failing to take preventative action allowing the insured to be held
harmless; and
12. Taking a hard-line settlement approach. 24

C. Assignability
In Missouri, the general rule is that causes of action, if they survive, are
assignable to the personal representative."z However, an exception to this
general rule exists: although personal injury actions survive, 126 they are not
2
assignable.1 1
Under this scheme, in Quick v. NationalAuto Credit,the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a bad faith cause of action was not assignable.12 To
reach this result, the Eighth Circuit had to distinguish Ganaway v. Shelter
Mutual InsuranceCo. 21 In Ganaway,the Missouri Court of Appeals upheld a
bankruptcy trustee's assignment of the debtor's bad faith claim. 3 The Ganaway
court reasoned that, under the 1978 Bankruptcy Act, all legal and equitable
interests of the debtor, including causes of action, became a part of the

124. Id at 750 (Mo. 1950); See DALE L. BECKERMAN, BAD FAITH LITIGATION IN
MissouRi 40 (1995).
125. Beall v. Farmers' Exch. Bank, 76 S.W.2d 1098, 1099 (Mo. 1934); Property
Exch. & Sales, Inc. v. Bozarth, 778 S.W.2d 1, 2 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Forsthove v.
Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 416 S.W.2d 208,217 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
126. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.020 (1994).

127. Beall, 76 S.W.2d at 1099; Bozarth, 778 S.W.2d at 2 n.1. See also Eastern Ati.
Transp. & Mechanical Eng'g, Inc. v. Dingman, 727 S.W.2d 418, 423 (Mo. Ct. App.

1987) (holding that a tort claim is assignable, to the extent that it provides the basis for
an award of exemplary damages, in an action for breach of contract).
128. 65 F.3d 741, 746 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1034 (1996)
(applying Missouri law).
129. 795 S.W.2d 554 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
130. Id.
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bankruptcy estate."3 ' The court then stated that "the general law" allows a bad
to a judgment creditor either by the insured or by a
faith claim to be assigned
3
bankruptcy trustee. 1
Recognizing a conflict between Ganaway and other Missouri precedent and
noting that "Ganawayruns upstream from clearly established Missouri law," the
Eighth Circuit preceded to distinguish Ganaway from Quick 33 The Eighth
Circuit noted that, in Missouri, a claim for damages for personal tort is
nonassignable, unless otherwise provided by statute. 3 1 Since Ganawayinvolved
35
a statutory exception to nonassignability, it was easily distinguished.
Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit held that the bad faith cause of action was
nonassignable.
D. Defenses
The defenses that were discussed in the context of first-party actions also
are applicable in the third-party context. In addition, the following defenses
apply to the third-party bad faith failure to settle action.
It is now well settled in Missouri that, where the insurer assumes the
defense of a suit against its insured and acts in bad faith in refusing to settle the
claim.within its policy limits when it has a chance to do so, it may be liable over
and above its policy limits. 36 "Conversely, where the company in good faith
believes there is a valid defense to the claim, even though the defense proves
unsuccessful and results in a judgment against the insured above the policy
limits, the company is not liable, because of such honest mistake, beyond the
limits of its policy."' 37 Good faith requires an insurer to settle within the policy
138
limits as its honest judgment and discretion dictates.

'131. Id. at 564.
132. Id at 565 (citing V. Woemer, Annotation, Assignability ofInsured's Right to
Recover Over Against Liability Insurerfor Rejection ofSettlement Offer, 12 A.L.R.3d

1158 (1967)).
133. Quick, 65 F.3d at 746.

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Landie v. Century Indem. Co., 390 S.W.2d 558, 563 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965)
(citing Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 228 S.W.2d 750 (Mo. 1950); McCombs v. Fidelity
& Cas. Co., 89 S.W.2d 114 (Mo. Ct. App. 1936); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cook-O'Brien
Const. Co., 69 F.2d 462 (8th Cir. 1934)).
137. Id.
(referring to Frank B. Connet Lumber Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co.,
236 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1956)).
138. Id.
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Liability insurance policies often contain valid and enforceable conditions
requiring the insured to cooperate. 39 If an insured does not perform the
conditions of the liability contract, then the insurer may be released from liability
under the policy for the particular casualty in question. For example, an
insured's failure to cooperate releases the insurer from liability, provided that the
insurer has not acted fraudulently, in bad faith, or collusively. 40 To establish
such a breach of a condition to cooperate, the insured's failure to cooperate must
be unexcused and substantially material. 4 ' Further, an insurer may have to show
prejudice. However, this showing of prejudice does not require that the insurer
sustained a pecuniary loss or that the jury verdict would have been different. It
requires only that the insurer show that it was prejudiced in the preparation and
defense of a case. 4 Both willfully misinforming the insurer as to facts essential
to the preparation of a defense and collusion with a plaintiff to misrepresent
material facts are situations which can constitute a failure of insured to
43
cooperate. 1
Also, if the claimant does not offer to settle, or is unwilling to settle, within
the policy limits, the insurer cannot be guilty of bad faith failure to settle.' 44 An
insurer must have the opportunity
to settle within the policy limits before bad
145
faith failure to settle can occur.
Furthermore, even though actions based on insurance contracts are
governed by a ten-year statute of limitations, 46 Missouri courts treat bad faith
failure to settle as an action in tort, not in contract. 47 Thus, bad faith actions are
governed by the five-year statute of limitations applicable to torts.'48 The statute
of limitations does not begin to run on a bad faith cause of action until the
appellate process is complete and a final judgment is entered. 49 However,
parties to insurance contracts are free to include mutually agreed-upon
limitations and restrictions when such limitations and restrictions do not conflict
with statute or public policy. 5 '

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Quisenberry v. Kartsonis, 297 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Mo. 1956).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 454.
Quisenberry, 297 S.W.2d at 453 (citing Fischer v. Western & Southern

Indem. Co., 106 S.W.2d 490,491 (Mo. Ct. App. 1937); Finkle v. Western Auto. Ins. Co.,
26 S.W.2d 843, 846-47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930).

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Landie v. Century Indem. Co., 390 S.W.2d 558, 564 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
Smith v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 4:03CV512 CDP (E.D. Mo. Feb 21, 1995).
Taylor v. Farmers Ins. Co., 906 S.W.2d 882, 886 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 228 S.W.2d 750, 756 (Mo. 1950).
Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.120.4 (1994).
149. Amdahl v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 484 N.W.2d 811, 813 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
150. Williams v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 929 S.W.2d 802, 809 (Mo. Ct. App.
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Reliance on the advice of competent counsel also may provide a defense
against bad faith allegations.' This defense is offered to prove that the insurer
acted reasonably and with proper cause.1 2 If, however, the insurer knew or had
reason to know that the advice was incorrect, this defense is not available.' The
court is permitted to explore whether the insurer's reliance was reasonable under
the circumstances.5 4 The assertion of this defense constitutes a limited waiver
of the attorney-client privilege between the insurer and its attorney.'
The
insured is entitled to discovery relating to this advice provided by counsel to the
insurer." 6
Also, if the statutory requirements are met, the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) preempts common law bad faith
causes of action against insurers who provide group insurance policies as
employee benefit plans. 7
Furthermore, because Missouri courts treat bad faith actions as actions in
tort, not in contract,5 8 the defense of comparative fault might be available to
insurers in the bad faith context. 5 9
Finally, the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing is mutual; it is owed
by both the insurer and the insured. 6 As such, it has been argued that an insurer
should not be subjected to a bad faith cause of action if the insured acted in bad
faith.'' Examples of an insured's bad faith include procuring a policy through
fraud and breaching contractual obligations.'62 The availability of this defense,
recognized and adopted in California, 63 remains to be determined in Missouri.
Additionally, if this affirmative defense is recognized, the question arises

1996).
151. Douglas R. Richmond, An Overview of Insurance Bad Faith Law and
Litigation,25 SETON HALL L. REV. 74, 119 (1994).
152. Id. (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 279 Cal. Rptr.

116, 118 (Ct. App. 1991)).
153. Id. at 121. (citing Allen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 656 F.2d 487, 489-90 (9th Cir.
1981)).
154. Id.

155. Id. at 119.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 127. See supra note 59 and accompanying text for the statutory
requirements.

158. Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 228 S.W.2d 750, 753-54 (Mo. 1950).
159. Patrick v. Maryland Cas. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 24, 27 (Ct. App. 1990)
(comparative fault recognized as an affirmative defense to an insurer's bad faith).
160. Richmond, supranote 151, at 128.

161. Id. at 131.
162. Id.
163. California Cas. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817, 823 (Ct.
App. 1985).
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whether an insurer then may sue the insured for breach of the implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing. This issue of "reverse bad faith" has not been
addressed by Missouri.'
E. Damages
The damages recoverable in a bad faith refusal to settle action "equal the
amount of money which the insured was forced to pay on the claim not settled
by virtue of ajudgment of liability in excess of the policy limits."' 65 In other
words, the insurer, found liable for a bad faith refusal to settle, is liable for the
entire judgment against the insured, including the portion of the award that is in
excess of the policy limits.
1. Punitive Damages'6 6
An allegation of bad faith on the part of an insurer is not sufficient, in itself,
to state a claim for punitive damages.' 67 Before punitive damages can be
awarded, the insured first must allege in the pleadings facts indicating that the
insurer maliciously, willfully, intentionally, or recklessly injured the insured by
its tortious act.'68 The insured must then show that the insurer committed a
wrongful act,knowing it to be wrongful, without just cause or excuse. 169
2. Attorney's Fees
The Missouri Supreme Court has stated that attorney's fees are recoverable
only when they are provided for by contract or statute, 17' as an item of damages

164. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Douglas R. Richmond, Insured's
BadFaith as Shield or Sword: LitigationRelieffor Insurers?,77 MARQ. L. REV. 41, 61

(1993).
165. Dyer v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 541 S.W.2d 702, 704-05 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976) (citing Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 228 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Mo. 1950); Landie v.

Century Indem. Co., 390 S.W.2d 558, 563 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965)).
166. See supra Part III, Section F, Subsection 3 of this Comment for a discussion
of Missouri's general rules regarding punitive damages awards.
167. Dyer, 541 S.W.2d at 706.
168. Id. (citing Zumwalt, 228 S.W.2d at 756).
169. Id (citing Yost v. Household Fin. Corp., 422 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976)).
170. Arnold v. Edelman, 392 S.W.2d 231, 239 (Mo. 1965) (citing Willis v.
American Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 287 S.W.2d 98, 107 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956)).
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incurred in collateral litigation, or when a court of equity finds punitive damages
7
necessary to balance the benefits.1 '
Relying on notions of equity, a federal court allowed recovery of attorney's
fees when an insurer's failure to settle was in bad faith. 72 The court concluded,
based on a proximate cause argument, that the insurer's "acts of omission gave
rise to the necessity for the employment of counsel, and unless plaintiff can be
reimbursed for this expenditure, then the damages as assessed will not
compensate it for the damages suffered on account of the acts of defendant. "17 1
The court was of the view that, under the circumstances, reasonable attorney's
fees incurred and paid by the insured may be recovered from the insurer as an
element of damage suffered.7 The defendant's bad faith in failing to settle was
the proximate cause of the insured's suit, and the attorney's fees were a proper
75
element of damages resulting therefrom.1
In some situations, the insurer may pursue a declaratory judgment action to
determine whether coverage exists. 76 Missouri Revised Statutes Section
527.100 provides, "In any proceeding under Sections 527.010 to 527.130 the
court may make such award of costs as may seem equitable and just." Thus,
"costs" under Section 527.100 may include attorney's fees.' 77 Awards of
attorney's fees are left to the broad discretion of the trial court and will not be
overruled except for an abuse of discretion.'78 Furthermore, courts are held to
be experts on attorney's fees.'79 Factors that ajudge should use to determine the
reasonable value of legal services include: time spent, nature and character of
services rendered, nature and importance of the subject matter, degree of
responsibility imposed on the attorney, value of property or money involved,
degree of professional ability required, and the result. 80 However, an insured
will not be able to recover attorney's fees if unresolved issues of fact and law

171. Id. (citing Duncan v. Townsend, 325 S.W.2d 67, 71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959)).
172. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Elmira Coal Co., 69 F.2d 616, 620 (8th Cir. 1934).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. The mere filing of a declaratory judgment action by the insurer to determine
the construction its own policy does not necessarily insulate the insurer from a bad faith
claim. BECKERMAN, supranote 124, at 40.
177. Labor's Educ. & Political Club-Indep. v. Danforth, 561 S.W.2d 339, 350 (Mo.
1977); Bemheimer v. First Nat'l Bank, 225 S.W.2d 745, 754-55 (Mo. 1949).
178. Geary v. Geary, 697 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
179. Id.
180. Union Ctr. Redevelopment Corp. v. Leslie, 733 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987).
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justify the insurer's bringing of the action, in good faith, to determine the
insured's obligations.''
VI. FAILURE TO DEFEND
Two different causes of action may exist when an insurer obligated to
provide a defense fails to do so. If the insurer does not provide a defense when
the insurance policy requires, the insurer has breached the contract.
Furthermore, insurance policies contain implied covenants of good faith and fair
dealing that prohibit either party from doing anything that will injure the other
party's right to receive the benefits of its agreement. Thus, an insurer who acts
in bad faith when failing to provide a defense may find itself subject to both a
breach of contract claim and a bad faith claim.
To establish a cause of action for breach of contract and bad faith failure to
defend, one must establish that a duty to defend existed. The first step is to
determine which state law governs. The criteria for determining which state law
governs contractual disputes was recently set out by the Missouri Court of
Appeals for the Western District:
Missouri uses the criteria contained in Sec. 188, The Restatement (Second)
of Conflicts of Law (1971), in choice of law situations dealing with contracts.
The contacts to be weighed and evaluated are: (1)the place of the contract;
(2) the place of negotiation of the contract; (3)the place of performance; (4)
the location of the subject matter of the conflict; and (5) the domicile,
residence,2 nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the
parties.1

After the applicable state law is determined, the next step is to determine
whether the duty to defend exists. The insurer's duty to defend is broader than
its duty to indemnify.' 83 The duty to defend is determined by comparing the
language of the policy with the allegations of the insured's petition.' If the
complaint alleges facts which state a claim potentially or arguably within policy

181. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Main, 295 F. Supp. 207, 219 (W.D. Mo.
1968).
182. Frost v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 828 S.W.2d 915, 920 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)
(citations omitted).
183. Bonner v. Auto. Club Inter-Ins. Exch., 899 S.W.2d 925, 929 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995) (citing Missouri Terrazzo Co. v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 740 F.2d 647, 652 (8th
Cir. 1984); Luyties Pharmacal Co. v. Frederic Co., 716 S.W.2d 831, 834-35 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1986)).
184. Id.
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coverage, there is a duty to defend.' Recall, however,
that parties to insurance
86
policies may contractually limit the duty to defend.
Despite the foregoing analysis, if coverage is at issue and the existence of
the duty to defend is nevertheless uncertain, the liability insurer has three
options.8 7 First, the insurer simply can defend the suit.' Second, the insurer
can defend the suit under a reservation of rights.' 89 With this option, the insurer
can litigate the case and later raise the issue of coverage. 90 Third, the insurer
can refuse to defend the insured.' 9' Under this approach, the insurer risks a
breach of contract action if coverage does in fact exist.192
A. Breach of ContractAction
In Missouri, a cause of action exists for breach of contract when an insurer,
obligated to provide a defense, fails to do so.Y The cases consistently hold that
when it is the insurer's duty to defend, and the insurer wrongfully refuses to do
so on the mistaken belief that the claim is not within the coverage of the policy,
the insurer is liable to the insured for all damages resulting to him as a result of
such breach. 4 This breach of contract action exists even if the insurer acts in
good faith and reasonably believes that there is no coverage under the policy. 95

185. Id

186. Id (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. v. Metcalf, 861 S.W.2d 751, 754-55 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1993). The court stated:

The public policy exception to the general principle of freedom to contract in
insurance policies is limited by the statute in which the exception is based,
section 303.190.2 RSMo. 1986. The statute is designed to protect injured
people who are hurt by negligent drivers. The contractual obligation to
defend is a protection provided to the insured, not the injured person.

Because the benefit of this provision inures to the insured and not the
innocent, injured person, it does not violate public policy to allow the parties
to contractually limit this duty.
Id.
187. Douglas R. Richmond, Lost in the Eternal Triangle of InsuranceDefense
Ethics, 9 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICs 475, 485 (1996).
188. Id.at 485-86.
189. Id.at 486.

190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Bonner v. Automobile Club Inter-Ins. Exch., 899 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995); Butters v. City of Independence, 513 S.W.2d 418, 424 (Mo. 1974); Landie
v. Century Indem. Co., 390 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
194. Landie, 390 S.W.2d at 562 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
195. Id.("Thus the universal rule which Missouri follows is that an insurance
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/3

26

1997]

Fussner: Fussner: Overview of Bad Faith Litigation in Missouri
BAD FAITH LITIGATION

By refusing to defend, "the insured is released from the policy prohibition
against incurring expenses and negotiating and settling claims."' 96 The insured
then may take any reasonable steps necessary to protect its interest. 197 And if it
is determined that the insured, in fact, had an obligation to defend, the insurer
becomes "obligated to reimburse the insured for such settlement, absent
collusion,.. .,19s

B. Bad FaithFailureto Defend
An insurer who acts in bad faith when failing to provide a defense may find
itself subject to both a breach of contract claim and a bad faith claim. This is due
to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in all contracts, including
insurance contracts."9 This implied covenant prohibits either party from doing
anything that will injure the other party's right to receive the benefits of its
agreement.
The bad faith failure to settle claim and the bad faith refusal to defend claim
involve two separate duties and are treated in different manners.

[Ain insurer's duty to defend is distinct and different from its duty to settle a
claim against its insured within the policy limits when it has the chance to do
so. It is also clear that a "bad faith" action for refusal to settle sounds in tort,
200
not in contract ....
The duty to defend, on the other hand, is contractual,
and this duty is a protection
20 1
provided to the insured, not the injured person.

company is liable to the limits of the policy plus attorney fees, expenses and other
damages where it refuses to defend an insured who is in fact covered. This is true even
though the company acts in good faith and has reasonable ground to believe there is no
coverage under the policy.").
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Lee, supra note 2, at 718.
200. Ganaway v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)
(citing Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 228 S.W.2d 750, 756 (Mo. 1950)).
201. Bonner v. Automobile Club Inter-Ins. Exch., 899 S.W.2d 925, 929 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995) (citing Crown Ctr. Redevelopment Corp. v. Occidental Fire & Cas. Co., 716
S.W.2d 348, 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)).
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C. Damages
The damages resulting from an insurer's failure to defend where there is
coverage is analogous to the measure of damages for a breach of contract. The
insurer will be responsible for "all damages reasonably flowing from such a
breach so as to put the insured in as good a position as he would have been in if
the company had performed its contract. 2 02 The insurer is liable to its insured
up to the limits of the policy plus attorney fees, costs, interest and other expenses
incurred by the insured in conducting the defense where it refuses to defend an
insured who is in fact covered.0 3
1. Punitive Damages
When the cause of action for failure to defend purely is for a breach of
contract, the general rule that punitive damages are not awarded for breach of
contract claims is applicable. 2° However, there is an exception to the general
rule denying punitive damages when a plaintiff alleges and proves a breach that
amounts to an independent and willful tort.210 The Missouri courts have yet to
address the applicability of the general rule and its exception to situations
involving a plaintiff who shows bad faith in the insurer's refusal to defend.
Other jurisdictions addressing this issue are split regarding whether punitive
damages are recoverable in an action based on an insurer's bad faith refusal to
defend. 2"

202. Landie v. Century Indem. Co., 390 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
203. Id.
204. Ladeas v. Carter, 845 S.W.2d 45, 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).

205. Id.
206. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. UTF Carriers, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 637, 640 (W.D.
Va. 1992) (Virginia law does not recognize a claim against insurer for punitive damages
based upon a theory that insurer failed to defend or satisfy claim against its insured in
good faith). Connecticut appears to recognize a tort remedy for an insurer's bad faith
breach of its duties under its insurance contracts. Id. New York courts treat bad faith
claims against insurers as contract claims and allow damages punitive in nature and
measure by allowing damaging in excess of policy limits in egregious contract cases. Id.
See also Indiana Gas Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 951 F.Supp 759, 764 (N.D. Ind.

1996); Broadhead v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 773 F. Supp. 882, 905 (S.D. Miss. 1991)
(under Texas law, where duty to deal fairly and in good faith with insured is breached by
insurer with conscious indifference to rights of insured, punitive damages may be
awarded); Cuson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 735 F. Supp. 966, 970 (D. Haw. 1990) (punitive
damages are recoverable in breach of contract'case); Tan Jay Int'l Ltd. v. Canadian
Indem. Co., 243 Cal. Rptr. 907, 913 (Ct. App. 1988) (allowing punitive damages for a
failure to defend); Erie Ins. Co. v. Hickman, 622 N.E.2d 515, 519 (Ind. 1993) (the district
court could not rule as a matter of law that the Indiana Supreme Court would not
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/3
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2. Attorney's Fees

The insurer is liable to its insured "to pay any judgment against him up to
the limits of the policy plus attorneyfees, costs, interest and other expenses
incurred by the insured in conducting the defense."207 Thus, upon the refusal of
an insurer to defend its insured, the insurer becomes liable for attorney's fees
incurred by the insured in defending an action. 20 8 However, attorney's fees
incurred in bringing the suit against the insured for damages for failure to defend
are not recoverable. 2' Further, the "universal rule" expressed in Landie was in
the context of attorney's fees incurred at the trial court level. However,
additional attorney's fees, incurred on an appeal taken by the insured from an
adverse judgment where the insurer has denied coverage and refused to defend,
may also be recovered.210
Furthermore, in addition to attorney's fees, if a bad faith failure to settle is
proven, then the insurer also may be held liable for that portion of the judgment
211
in excess of the policy limit.
D. Defenses
As the failure to defend is a contractual cause of action, the defenses to
normal contract actions are available. Many of the defenses discussed in the
context of first-party actions and third-party bad faith failure to settle actions are
equally applicable in the refusal to defend context.
In order to make out a claim for a failure to defend, the plaintiff must first
show that such a duty existed:

recognize a cause of action in tort for the breach of a duty of good faith in the context of
a breach of a duty to defend a third-party claim); Farris v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 587 P.2d 1015, 1023 (Or. 1978) (an insurer's bad faith refusal to defend its insured
under a liability policy gives rise only to a breach of contract claim for which punitive
damages cannot be recovered).
207. Landie, 390 S.W.2d at 562 (emphasis added).
208. Fuller v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 714 S.W.2d 698, 702 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1986) (citing Centennial State Bank v. S.E.K. Constr. Co., 518 S.W.2d 143, 151
(Mo. Ct. App. 1974)).
209. Id. (citing Broquedis v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 45 A.2d 591, 596
(N.Y. App. Div. 1974)).
210. Heshion Motors v. Western Int'l Hotels v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 600
S.W.2d 526, 539 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the insured is entitled to recover for
the additional attorney's fees incurred during the appeal).
211. See supra Part II of this Comment for a more thorough analysis of this
proposition.
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The duty of a liability insurer to defend is determined by comparing the
policy language and the allegations of the petition in an action brought by a
person injured. Ifthe complaint alleges facts which state a claim
potentially
21
or arguably within policy coverage, there is a duty to defend. 1
However, parties to insurance policies may contractually limit the duty to
defend. The insurer can negate the existence of a duty to defend by establishing
213
that the insured's claim fell within a policy exclusion.
Breach of contract actions are governed by a five-year statute of
limitations. 2 4 Such actions are not deemed to accrue when the wrong is done
or the technical breach of contract or duty occurs, but when the last item of
damages resulting therefrom is sustained and is capable of ascertainment.215
Damage is sustained and capable of ascertainment for purposes of the statute of
limitations when it can be discovered or made known, even if the amount of
damage is unascertained. 1
When the damage becomes capable of
ascertainment, the statute of limitations is put in motion.2 7
VII. BAD FAITH FAILURE TO SETTLE
AND FAILURE TO DEFEND
In the bad faith failure to settle and failure to defend situation, the insurer
has breached two duties owed to the insured: the duty imposed by the policy to
defend the insured, and the duty to exercise good faith in considering an
opportunity to settle a claim within policy limits when a demand for settlement
is made by the insured. Thus, the insurer has refused to defend the insured, and,
while persisting in such refusal to defend, the insurer also has refused to settle
the suit against its insureds within the limits of the policy, although such
settlement was demanded by the insured. "[A]n insurer's duty to defend is
distinct and different from its duty to settle a claim against its insured within its
policy limits when it has a chance to do so. It is also clear that a'bad faith' action
for refusal to settle sounds in tort, not in contract.. ,,2" The duty to defend, on

212. Bonner v. Auto Club Inter-Ins. Exch., 899 S.W.2d 925, 929 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995).

213. Id
214. Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.120 (1994).
215. Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.100 (1994).
216. Modem Tractor & Supply Co. v. Leo Joumagan Constr. Co., 863 S.W.2d 949,
952 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
217. Id.
218. Ganaway v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)
(citing Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 228 S.W.2d 750, 756 (Mo. 1950)).
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the other hand, is contractual and is a protection provided to the insured, not the
injured person.219
When the failure to defend and failure to settle both are present, the
question becomes the extent to which the insurer is liable for the judgment in
excess of the policy limits. The insurer may argue that the breach of contract
should not exceed the policy limits since the insurer has not assumed control of
the defense. However, this argument has been rejected by the courts. 2"
In Landie v. Century Indemnity Co., the court was confronted with the task
of applying the well-settled rules for failure to settle and failure to defend to a
situation in which both were present in the same case. 22 ' The Landie court first
pointed out that a company "which breached its contract by failure to defend
could not thereby be put in a better position than a company which honored its
contract and did defend."' m Otherwise, insurers who refused both to defend and
to settle would be protected by the policy limits while those who provided a
defense but refused to settle could be liable beyond the policy limits.
In fixing damages for breach of contract, the insured is entitled to be put in
as good a position as he would have been in had the insurer honored the
contract.' When there is no bad faith failure to settle, this can be accomplished
by requiring the company to pay the judgment within the limits of the policy,
plus attorney's fees and other related expenses incurred by the insured in his
defense of the lawsuit. 4 However, this same remedy would not make the
insured whole when there is wrongful refusal to settle within the limits of the
policy.,
Where the company performs it [sic] contract and defends the suit, the insured
has a right to good faith consideration by the company of settlement offers
within the limits of the policy. If the company refuses, in bad faith, to settle
within the limits, the insured can recover the full amount of the judgment in
excess of the policy limits from the company. Thus it follows that where the
company breaches its contract and refuses to defend, the insured can only be
put in as good a position as he would have been in had not the contract been
breached, if the company is required to give good faith consideration to offers
of settlement within the limits of the policy, and the insured is given the right

219. Bonner v. Automobile Club Inter-Insur. Exch., 899 S.W.2d 925, 929 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995).
220. Landie v. Century Indem. Co., 390 S.W.2d 558, 563 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); See
also W. E. Shipley, Annotation, Duty ofLiability Insurersto Settle or Compromise, 40
A.L.R.2d 168 (1955) (cases cited therein).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 564.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Landie, 390 S.W.2d at 564-65.
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to recover judgment in excess of the policy limit when settlement within these
226
limits is refused in bad faith by the company.
VIII. RELATED CAUSES OF ACTION
Breach of contract, fraud and negligence are three common law causes of
action related to the third-party bad faith claims.
As discussed earlier, a cause of action exists for breach of contract when an
insurer, obligated to provide a defense, fails to do so. 227 If this breach is
accompanied by a bad faith failure to settle, the insurer may be liable for the
entire judgment, including the amounts in excess of the policy limits.
Missouri recognizes many situations in which a cause of action based on
fraud exists, including insurance cases. For example, parties have alleged fraud
in the valuation of damaged property." Also, there have been instances in
which insurers have alleged that the insureds are guilty of fraud in the execution
of an agreement pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes Section 537.065.229
Section 537.065 allows a claimant and a tort-feasor contractually to limit
recovery to specified assets or insurance coverage. The agreement between the
claimant and tort-feasor is valid if it is free from collusion or fraud." However,
no reported Missouri cases deal with the situation in which an excess verdict
results in a fraud claim between an insurer and insured.
Even though several states, such as Kansas and Iowa, recognize a
negligence cause of action against an insurer when ajudgment in excess of the
policy limits results, Missouri does not. In Zumwalt v. UtilitiesInsurance Co.,
the Missouri Supreme Court carefully considered this problem of an insurer's
bad faith failure to settle within the policy limits and concluded that such an,
action was not based on negligence. 1 However, nothing seems to bar an action
based on the insurer's negligence giving rise to the unfavorable verdict.
Missouri Revised Statutes Section 375.1000.2, the Unfair Claims
Settlement Practices Act, states, "Nothing in sections 375.1000 to 375.1018 shall
be construed to create or imply a private cause of action for violation of sections

226. Id.
227. Bonner v. Automobile Club Inter-Ins. Exch., 899 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995); Butters v. City of Independence, 513 S.W.2d 418, 425 (Mo. 1974); Landie,
390 S.W.2d at 562.
228. Dewitt v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 667 S.W.2d 700 (Mo. 1984)
(absent fraud, misrepresentation or collusion, the valuation in a fire insurance policy is
conclusive upon the parties).
229. See supra Part VIII.
230. Houston Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lackey, 907 S.W.2d 177, 180 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
231. Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 228 S.W.2d 750 (Mo. 1950).
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375.1000 to 375.1018." Therefore, in bad faith litigation cases, statutory
breaches normally are not a factor.
IX. DISCOVERY

2

A. Evidence
The focus of discovery in bad faith cases is on the conduct of the insurance
company. A wide range of evidence may be used to support a claim of bad faith,
from a failure to keep the insured fully informed of all significant developments
in the claim, to the failure to take an appeal following the verdict in excess of the
policy limits when there are grounds to do so. The manner and method of
discovery in a bad faith refusal to settle claim obviously vary from case to case.
However, the general focus is on the decision of the insurer in refusing to settle
the claim. Discovery invariably includes the basis for the insurer's decision in
addition to identification of all documentation or other information used by the
insurer to support this decision.
A comprehensive set of interrogatories should be served on the insurer at
the earliest opportunity in the litigation. Obviously, this should be done prior to
taking any depositions. The interrogatories should ask the insurance company
to identify all persons who worked on the underlying claim, including those
persons who were involved in the insurance company's decision to refuse to
settle. Interrogatories also can be used to determine the insurer's basis for
refusing to settle and to identify all documentation or other information used by
the company to support this decision.
Typically the most important aspect of plaintiffs discovery requests will be
directed to the production of the insurer's documentation. A request for
production should begin with a request for the insurance company's entire claims
file. In addition to the claims file, a request for production also should include
the following:
1. A complete copy of plaintiffs insurance policy;
2. All correspondence, memoranda or other documents relating to the
handling of the underlying claim;
3. All internal correspondence, memoranda or other documents relating
to the evaluation of the underlying claim;
4. All correspondence, memoranda or other documents relating to the
insurer's decision relating to or supporting the insurer's decision to refuse
to pay the underlying claim;

232. Part IX was completed with the assistance of John Simon, a partner at the law
firm of Gray and Ritter, St. Louis, Missouri. Gray and Ritter is a plaintiffs litigation
firm, thus, the discovery discussion takes the plaintiffs perspective.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997

33

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 3

MISSOURILAWREVIEW

[Vol. 62

5. All investigative reports, medical records, or other documentation in
the insurer's possession at the time of its decision to refuse to pay the
underlying claim;
6. All manuals or other documents containing any written policies or
procedures of the insured regarding the evaluation, handling, or settlement
of claims.
The attorney should give consideration to taking the deposition of each
person who was involved either in the handling of the underlying claim or in the
insured's decision to refuse to settle the claim.
Taking a deposition of the insurance company itself, pursuant to Missouri
Supreme Court Rule 57.03(b)(4), also can be very helpful. Rule 57.03(b)(4)
requires that the insurer produce a representative to testify on its behalf as to
specifically designated matters. The notice may also be sent with a request to
produce pursuant to Rule 57.03(b)(3). A Rule 57.03(b)(4) deposition is
particularly effective because the person so designated by the insurer is required
to testify as to all matters known or reasonably available to the insurance
company.
A Rule 57.03(b)(4) deposition should request that the insurer produce a
particular person to testify to the following matters:
1. All information known to the insurer at the time it made its decision
to refuse to settle the underlying claim;
2. All steps taken or efforts made by the insured to investigate the
underlying claim;
3. The authenticity of all documents relating to the underlying claim
which were in the insured's possession at the time of its decision to refuse
settlement;
4. The identity of all employees of the insurer who were involved in any
way in handling the subject claim or involved in the insurer's decision to
refuse to settle;
5. All policies, procedures, rules and regulations of the insurer regarding
the handling and evaluation of claims.
B. Effect ofPrivilegeson Discovery
Most likely, the insurer will object to discovery requests based on any one
of three privileges: the attorney-client privilege, the insurer-insured privilege,
or the work-product rule.
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1. Attorney-Client Privilege
Confidential communications between an attorney and his client are
absolutely privileged from disclosure against the will of the client.23 ' Where
legal advice of any kind is sought from an attorney in his capacity as such, the
confidential communications relevant to that purpose are permanently protected
from disclosure by both the client and the attorney. 4 Documents falling within
the attorney-client privilege also are protected? 5 However, this privilege may
be waived by voluntary disclosure of information inconsistent with the
confidential nature of the attorney-client relationship. 6
The attorney-client privilege simply is not available to the insurer as a
means to object to the discovery of communications between the insured and
insurer. First, the communications are not between an attorney and client.
Second, if this privilege does exist, it belongs to the client. The client filing suit
and seeking discovery of the information surely satisfies the waiver
requirements.
2. Insurer-Insured Privilege
In State ex rel. Cain v. Barker, the Missouri Supreme Court stated that an
insurer-insured relationship receives the same protection as the attorney-client
relationship. 7 This congruent protection is necessary because the insured
delegates the selection of an attorney and the defense of any litigation to his
liability insurer. 8 Thus, the insured assumes the communications between the
insurer and the insured are made for the purpose of transmitting such information
to an attorney for the protection of the insured. 9 Public policy encourages the
insured to make a full report to his insurer without fear of discovery by an
adverse party.240 However, in bad faith cases, this rationale simply does not
apply because the insurer and insured are adversaries. Following this logic,
Missouri1 courts have not recognized the insurer-insured privilege in bad faith
cases.

24

233. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 601 (8th Cir. 1978).
234. Id. at 602.
235. Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1482 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Mo. Sup. Ct. R.
56.01(b)(1)).
236. Id.
237. 540 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. 1976).
238. Id. at 54.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See State ex rel. Safeco Nat'l Ins. v. Rauch, 849 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. Ct. App.
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3. Work Product Rule
The work product rule states that "information or materials assembled by
or for a person in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial may be
'
qualifiedly privileged from disclosure to an opposing party."242
There is a
conflict among the courts as to whether a "bad faith exception" to the work
product doctrine exists. In CentralNationalInsuranceCo. v. MedicalProtective
Co., the court pointed out that work product is clearly a qualified privilege that
can be defeated by good cause. 243 Because communications pertaining to
settlement negotiations are at the heart of a bad faith failure to settle claim, the
court concluded that good cause was established when the insured filed his
claim. 2 " Thus, the insured was allowed to discover documents and information
24
relating to settlement negotiations in a claim against the insurer. 1
C. Recent Developments
In Morrisv. J.C.Penney Life Insurance Co.,2 46 the plaintiff contended that
a defendant-insurer's uncooperative behavior in discovery was relevant to a
vexatious refusal claim. The court rejected defendant's argument and stated that
"a defendant has the right to defend an action with all the weapons at its
command so long as it has reasonable grounds to believe its defense is
'247
meritorious.
In State ex rel. Safeco NationalInsurance Co. v. Rauch,2" the court held
that the "insureds' filing of an uninsured motorist claim against insurer created
[an] 'adversarial environment,' so that workers, to discover work product
material potentially included within the investigation file, would be required to

1993).
242. Diversified Indus., Inc., v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 601 (8th Cir. 1977).
243. 107 F.R.D. 393, 395 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
244. Id.
245. Id For three other approaches dealing with the work product rule in bad faith
cases, see McDougall v. Dunn, 468 F.2d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 1972) (any report or
statement not requested nor prepared for an attorney nor which otherwise reflects the
employment of an attorney's legal expertise must be conclusively presumed to have been
made in the ordinary course of business and is not privileged); Brown v. Superior Court,
670 P.2d 725, 733 (Ariz. 1983) (intermediate position in which court weighed different
factors to determine if material is privileged as work product); Fireman's Fund Insurance
Company v. McAloine, 391 A.2d 84, 87 (R.I. 1978) (information gathered by insurance
company after an occurrence that might give rise to a claim against it is privileged).
246. 895 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).

247. Id. at 78.
248. 849 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
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make the requisite showing of substantial need and inability without undue
hardship to obtain substantial equivalent." The court also held that this work
product privilege was not waived by the insurer's reliance on the affirmative
defense of insureds' failure to comply with the assistance and cooperation
conditions of the policy.249
The court also addressed the insurer's contention that dismissal of the
insured's vexatious refusal to pay claim made the discovery of materials in the
investigation file irrelevant. But as the court pointed out, "the propriety of
discovery is a matter of *discretion for the trial court, the relevance of any
particular discoverable materials sought is a determination to be made initially
by the trial court."" 0
X. CONCLUSION

This Comment addressed first-party vexatious refusal to pay actions and
third-party actions arising from an insurer's bad faith failure to settle, breach of
a contractual duty to defend, and bad faith refusal to defend. The recent
evolution of bad faith claims often has left insurers with adverse judgments far
exceeding insurance policy limits. With so much at stake, this area of law
should continue to be hotly contested by both plaintiffs' and insurers' lawyers.
ANTHONY G. FUSSNER

249. Id. at 635.
250. Id. at 636.
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